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Heidegger’s Philosophy of Language in Being and Time 
n Being and Time Martin Heidegger does not provide a 
substantial theory of language however, there are several 
parts of the text dedicated to language, and it has clear 
importance for the ontology of Dasein. Language is no 
less important for Heidegger, who gets many of his in-
sights from literal translations of the Greek words and 
introduces plenty of neologisms, which are crucial for explicating 
his views. In this paper I will provide an account of Heidegger’s 
discussion of language in Being and Time in order to argue  that 
the truth of Heidegger’s conception of Dasein depends upon the 
distinction he draws between discourse and language. Further-
more, I will argue that if this distinction is collapsed, his theory 
would deny the possibility of truth in the world. First, I will out-
line the difference between discourse [Rede] and language 
[Sprache], and show that discourse seems to be privileged above 
language. Then, I will describe Heidegger’s theory of logos and 
his polemic against the previous philosophical tradition with re-
gard to the notion of ‘truth..’ Next, I will explain Heidegger’s 
views on cognition (understanding and interpretation), where I 
will identify points of ambiguity. In conclusion, by addressing 
Heidegger’s own use of language, I will show how this ambiguity 
could be resolved in order to avoid the collapse of the distinction 
between discourse and language, and show that this distinction 
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plays a far more important role in Being and Time than 
Heidegger makes it seem. 
For our inquiry, we should first outline how Heidegger 
distinguishes between discourse and language. Discourse, accord-
ing to Heidegger, is a fundamental existential phenomenon, the 
main purpose of which is to ensure a basic understanding of the 
world. In contrast, language is a way in which discourse com-
municates or articulates itself. Language is an inherited system 
that Dasein encounters in the world, and which allows for the ex-
pression of Dasein’s understanding. Furthermore, language is a 
totality of words, or at least this is the way we encounter it in the 
world. In light of this distinction, I will argue that language and 
discourse have different kinds of Being, but in some moments of 
Heidegger’s inquiry, he conflates the two such that it is hard to 
tell which category is at play. I would also like to discuss the pos-
sibility that it is actually language, and not discourse, that disclos-
es the world to us.  
 
I. Logos and Truth 
Heidegger’s first explicit discussion of discourse in Being 
and Time is when he explains his method and describes the task 
of phenomenology. He etymologizes the term “phenomenology,” 
by analyzing the Greek words phenomenon and logos. Already, 
Heidegger dismisses the duality of the ideal and the real, which 
had permeated philosophical tradition since antiquity onwards. 
Furthermore, according to Heidegger, Dasein is inseparable from 
the world. Thus, Heidegger investigates Being, by focusing on 
Being-in-the-world (Da-sein),  the fundamental feature of Dasein.  
Heidegger’s introduction of a new kind of relation between 
Dasein and the World, establishes a correspondence between the 
ideal (what is in Dasein’s consciousness) and the real (what is in 
the world); an act of the disclosure.  
Broadly speaking, the task of phenomenology for 
Heidegger is to let things show themselves as they are. 
“Phenomenon” is the way in which a thing shows itself to us. 
When defining “phenomenon,” Heidegger is very much opposed 
to the word “appearance”, because it is ambiguous, suggesting 
that an entity is either making itself manifest or hiding itself by 
seeming to be something that it is not. Furthermore, logos is, for 
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Heidegger, of crucial importance as it represents his divergence 
from philosophical tradition. He claims that the Greek word logos 
[ “word”] was mistranslated and thus misunderstood by Instead, 
Heidegger determines logos to mean discourse [Rede, “talk”], 
which is opposed to the translation of logos as “judgment” or 
“assertion.” In the philosophical tradition, these words are funda-
mentally synthetic because, by producing a judgment, one asserts 
a correspondence between two entities. For example, a relation-
ship between “something said” and the fact about which it was 
said exists. Primarily, this relationship has been one of judgment, 
which corresponds to fact, therefore is true when the fact is true. 
Discourse, on the other hand, does not assert anything, in the tra-
ditional sense. However, in what is said it communicates what is 
being talked about: it shows something as something, i.e. as it 
really is. Additionally, Heidegger emphasizes the preposition 
“as,” because it reflects the key relation of the phenomenological 
inquiry. Phenomenology studies things as they manifest them-
selves to us. Heidegger calls this “as” of assertion apophantic 
[Greek: “making known”], not because it demarcates two differ-
ent things and asserts a connection between them, but because 
‘as’ establishes a unity in which what is said goes together with 
what it is said about. Moreover, we can make assertions only on 
the basis of our understanding, and not on the basis of facts. With 
regard to logos, Heidegger mentions that the Greeks actually did 
not have a special word for language to separate it from dis-
course.I Because logos in the sense of talking about something in 
the first place meant an apophantic assertion,in the sense that eve-
ry speech act exhibited something or made manifest,, language 
and discourse have different ontological foundations.. 
Likewise, the Greek word for truth is “aletheia,” which 
Heidegger interprets literally as “not-concealing”. He believes 
that the fundamental meaning of truth is “uncovering”. Although 
he does not deny that truth can pertain to a judgment as a deter-
minable value (as in truth-functional logic, for example, where 
one can assign truth-values to sentences), he considers this tradi-
tional concept of “truth as correspondence” to be grounded in the 
phenomenon of “truth as uncovering.” This allows Heidegger to 
claim that logos is something that actually does reveal truth, but  
truth which is defined in completely different terms than that of 
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classical tradition. Heidegger’s interpretation of truth is one not in 
a sense of correspondence, but in a sense of either covering up the 
thing as it is and hiding it behind something else (which amounts 
to us seeing seeing the things as false) or uncovering and showing 
the thing as it is in itself (being true). One may hereby conclude 
that the main ontological function of discourse is uncovering, and 
therefore telling the truth. 
Furthermore, Heidegger defines the primary ontological 
function of discourse, by introducing the “hermeneutical circle,” 
which shows that interpretation can emerge only on the basis of 
already existing understanding. It is the structure of this circle of 
interpretation that reflects the condition of Being for Dasein. He 
argues that the word “logos” is etymologically connected with the 
Greek words legein and legomenon, meaning “to exhibit” and 
“what is exhibited,” respectively. Legein is a capacity of human 
reason, and therefore logos can also signify “reason” (which 
makes it possible to translate logos into Latin as ratio - “reason”). 
Legomenon, by definition, is something that underlies the process 
of addressing to whatever is exhibited, it does not exist inde-
pendently of being addressed (that allows logos to signify the 
ground which causes it to say something). However, logos and 
legomenon cannot be equivalent because legomenon as the 
ground will always underlie the logos. So logos qua legomenon 
(i.e. “discourse as what is exhibited,” or “speech as what is said”) 
is a ratio, in a sense that one is related to the other, and this ratio 
establishes a new signification for the logos: the signification of 
the relation (i.e. logos and the thing can exist only as a relation 
between the two things). The ontological definition of discourse 
is thus threefold: how it discloses a thing, what ii disclosed, and 
the relation that it establishes between the how and the what. In 
other words, logos is defined as exhibiting something and also as 
exhibiting itself in this relation. 
 
II. Understanding and Significance 
As mentioned earlier, Dasein and the world exist insepa-
rably from each other. The world is already there when Dasein 
gets into it. That is why Heidegger calls this condition of being-in
-the-world “fallenness” or “thrownness.” Understanding is a fun-
damental way of getting knowledge about the world - the 
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“uncovering” of discourse is made possible through understand-
ing. Dasein’s main mode of existence is Care; i.e. it is always 
concerned with its existence and it understands the world primari-
ly in terms of the possibilities which it can take up, and therefore 
its relation to the world is fundamentally practical. Such practical 
activities as producing, discussing, or accomplishing something 
would be examples of Care. We see things in the world also in 
terms of possibilities, i.e. we see them as “ready-to-hand” (as 
equipment).When we use equipment on a regular basis, we never 
understand explicitly the use which has already been assigned by 
the world to this piece of equipment. For example, we do not 
make it explicit when we take a pen to write something, that the 
pen is the tool for writing. We use it in order to write something, 
but not as “something that writes.” But this assignment of the use 
is already present in the world in which this pen exists. 
Heidegger is interested in the analysis of the phenomenon 
of the world - “the Worldhood of the World.” As described in the 
previous part, the phenomenon is related to us in a way that it is 
something that manifests itself, or, in Heidegger’s words, 
“announces itself.” The phenomenon of the world reveals itself 
through the “assignments and referential totalities” between the 
items of equipment and how they are referred to. One might think 
that this happens independently of Dasein. However, the only 
reason that these hold together is precisely Dasein’s understand-
ing of the world. Since we encounter the world as ready-to-hand, 
the phenomenon of the world can only be explained in terms of 
our relation to it, of our being directed “towards-the-world” in 
taking up our possibilities. For Dasein the world exists for-the-
sake-of Dasein because the primary way it understands the world 
is in terms of possibilities. It is important to note that discourse as 
well is characterized by its “aboutness,” so in disclosing the 
world to us it already gives us what in the world we should con-
sider our possibilities, such that we understand the world existing 
for the realization of our possibilities. Our understanding assigns 
to the whole world this “significance,” such that it has a meaning 
in its totality.  Therefore, the items in the world are disclosed to 
us as having significations or meaning. 
Heidegger’s use of the word “significance” (or 
“meaning”) is ambiguous: it can either denote “signifying some-
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thing” [Bedeutung] or “having importance” [Bedeutsamkeit] for 
us. These two meanings of “significance” imitate a similar word-
play to that of the two meanings of logos. It can also be seen in 
terms of the hermeneutical circle: our understanding gives signifi-
cance to all items in the world, but how significant they are is al-
so dependent on our fundamental relatedness to the world as 
“thrownness.” Heidegger mentions in his discussion of signifi-
cance that “the Being of words and of language” is founded upon 
these significations.II By this he means the connection between 
understanding and discourse is a way in which they both consti-
tute the foundations of language. Since both understanding and 
discourse are equiprimordial (i.e. equally prior,) with relation to 
Dasein, and ensure the possibility of disclosure, then language 
should have a different “founded” type of Being. I shall return to 
this point later in more detail.  
 
III. Interpretation and Assertion 
We understand the world in terms of our possibilities. 
However, understanding usually happens implicitly, because we 
are existentially not “knowers,” but “doers.” Since we are already 
thrown into the world and see things as they are, we do not think 
whether, for instance, the pen is a tool for writing in order to 
write something, we simply write with it. However, when a tool 
we are using, the pen, breaks, we suddenly realize the ‘toolness’ 
of this pen, and start seeing it as a tool for writing. In this mo-
ment, when we see something as something, our understanding 
becomes explicit and switches into the mode of interpretation.  
Interpretation happens through the hermeneutic “as.”  We 
are asserting something that has already been disclosed to us 
about this thing: its preconception. Moreover, we receive this pre-
conception as a disclosure through discourse. Yet Heidegger ar-
gues that entities within-the-world have meaning [Sinn; it could 
be better to say “make sense,” in order to capture the connection 
preserved in German with another meaning of the word, 
“reason”] only when they have been discovered by us.III Meaning 
is articulated through our understanding and does not belong to 
the entities as a property, but to Dasein itself (“...only Dasein can 
be meaningful or meaningless”).IV If we remember that one of the 
significations of discourse was the capacity of the human mind to 
Heidegger’s Philosophy of Language in Being and Time 64 
make sense or to understand, we can see that sense becomes one 
of the existentialia of Dasein. We notice again the structure of the 
hermeneutical circle: things obtain meaning because Dasein, be-
ing thrown into the world, endows them with meaning.  In this 
instance, Heidegger does not mention words and does not inquire 
whether they have meaning. Therefore, language (as a totality of 
words) seems to be excluded from giving sense or making sense 
of things. It does not bear meaning (contrary to discourse, which 
discloses it through the act of understanding) and meaning is ac-
quired and revealed on some more primordial level. 
By analyzing assertion as a particular kind of interpreta-
tion, Heidegger clearly distinguishes assertion from logos to dis-
associate himself from the classical tradition, where they were 
merged and assertion was the primary ‘locus’ of truth. Because he 
has established the meaning of truth as disclosure (contrary to 
truth as correspondence); truth cannot be contained in the asser-
tion itself, which is grounded in understanding and therefore has 
a derivative nature. 
Assertion, unlike understanding, is a ‘vocal’ phenomenon, 
because assertion primarily articulates. Heidegger mentions three 
dimensions of an assertion: it points out, it predicates, and it com-
municates. In “pointing-out,” the assertion does not first assert 
and then judges whether what has been said is true or false of the 
object, but rather points out at this object as it is and not as a part 
of the sentence which refers to this object. Therefore, it preserves 
the possibility of truth as disclosure.  An example of predication, 
“the ball is heavy,” asserts a “heaviness” only after the heaviness 
has been experienced. i.e. It was disclosed to us, so we have to 
take a step back from our practical considerations caused by 
“heaviness,” interpreting what we have felt and settling it into a 
statement. Communication is sharing our relatedness to the world 
(Being-in-the-world) with others, i.e. asserting that we are here 
and we have had such-and-such a disclosure.  
It is most important to note Heidegger’s discussion of the 
existential-hermeneutical ‘as’ (or of theoretical judgments). He 
describes the process of the transformation of our understanding 
which shifts our understanding of things from being ready-to-
hand to present-at-hand. When we want to talk about something 
in terms of its presence in the world (but not in terms of our pos-
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sibilities), we want to separate it from the equipmental totality of 
the world in which we live. Thus, in order to perform theoretical 
tasks, we assert things independently of our concerns about them. 
 
IV. Language 
Logos as a philosophical category (i.e. through the her-
meneutical ‘as’), becomes present-at-hand and manifests itself as 
an entity (it stops working as an ontological foundation, but is 
being questioned as one). As mentioned earlier, Heidegger took a 
Greek word logos and distinguished its two meanings: discourse 
and language. Previously, he was “exhibiting” logos as a phe-
nomenon, letting it “speak” on its own, or disclose itself. Now 
that he takes up the hermeneutic approach, or the approach of in-
terpretation, Heidegger sees logos only as a totality of words, that 
is to say, language. 
Language is a totality of words that can exist for us either 
as a tool, or as something present-at-hand. For example, when we 
use language to communicate, it is encountered as ready-to-hand 
(so we treat it practically), but when we engage with a philologi-
cal analysis of a text, we look at the words in the text as at present
-at-hand, not from a practical perspective. Heidegger writes that 
language has a different being from that of the discourse, because 
language is grounded in the Being of discourse, and discourse is 
equiprimordial with understanding: together they are the existen-
tiale of Dasein. Heidegger regards language as an existential cate-
gory, where discourse and Dasein “meet” each other. He claims 
that language is a “worldly” being of discourse, precisely for the 
reason that it is the only way Dasein could understand discourse. 
Discourse expresses itself through language, and but the former 
can also potentially be covered-up by the latter, and this is most 
likely to happen precisely when discourse is being interpreted. 
However, even if discourse gets “disguised” or “veiled,” it re-
mains a basic structure; it exists as an existentialia of Dasein, and 
only waits to be uncovered. Eventually, one might still see lan-
guage as creating a “gap” between Dasein and discourse, but it 
still can seem unclear why Heidegger needs so that this “gap” 
existed. He could eliminate the difference between discourse and 
language and still claim that Dasein can misinterpret the logos 
and that is how the covering-up of the truth from Dasein happens. 
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Language is primarily the instrument of interpretation, 
because it communicates. Expression is one of the characteristics 
of assertion, as an assertion must be “spoken” out. Consequently, 
without language we would not be able to make assertions of the 
existential-hermeneutic kind. Also only through language can we 
express the hermeneutic shift from the ready-to-hand to the pre-
sent-at-hand, i.e. we can bracket the word from its context and 
place it into a different one. When we take a word, we see the 
form of this word (i.e. letters or sounds that comprise it), while at 
the same time we understand the its meaning. For example, when 
we look at the word “dog,” we understand that what it stands for 
is “an animal that barks.” On the other hand, we could look at the 
word “dog” as  an example of “a word,” and it would be irrele-
vant to us which word from the totality of words is written, a 
“dog,” a “cat,” or anything else, because what it stands for is 
merely “a word”. In this sense in the “dog” words manifest them-
selves as a totality.  
This analysis strikingly resembles the schema of the 
“hermeneutical circle.” This circle can be accessible and de-
scribed only through the means of language that is by definition 
interpretive. Any word can stand for the hermeneutical circle, be-
cause it is the “how” (its sounds and letters) and the “what” (its 
meaning), and also establishes the relation between the two by its 
definition (in virtue of being a word). This is how Heidegger cre-
ates a relation with respect to the logos. 
In hermeneutical analysis, the Being of logos manifests 
itself only as an assertion. However, this should not happen when 
we talk about logos in the meaning of discourse, because dis-
course can either disclose or conceal, it cannot interpret. It cannot 
include two possibilities of disclosure simultaneously (i.e. to 
show its form and its content at the same time, since it is impossi-
ble to perceive both at the same time), because otherwise it would 
be impossible to tell the truth. Truth can be either disclosed or not 
disclosed: when it is, then it should stand alone. Discourse as a 
phenomenon wants to communicate to us through the apophantic 
“as.” The “as” that establishes a unity, a fundamental relation of 
already being there and seeing things “as” they are between the 
Dasein and the world. While the hermeneutical “as” separates the 
two by being able to shift between the ready-to-hand and the pre-
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sent-at-hand. Heidegger needs this distinction, because he is en-
gaging in a  phenomenological inquiry which, by definition, has 
“demonstrative precision.” It exhibits Being as it is, without cov-
ering it up, or, in other words, he wants to get a true (even in the 
sense of “truth as disclosure”) analysis of Being. If he conveyed 
all his analyses on the basis of language, he would be left with the 
“truth” claims that can always potentially be misinterpreted. 
 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have attempted to show that for 
Heidegger’s purposes the distinction between the logos as dis-
course and logos as language is crucial. Without it, his analysis 
could never claim to be true. However, the main tool of his ac-
count is language and the hermeneutical “as,” justifying his con-
clusions. Eventually, the hermeneutical circle, being a circle of 
interpretation, shows that it is not discourse, but language which 
underlies Dasein’s understanding. Therefore one can further ar-
gue that language is the primordial mode of Dasein’s thrownness 
into the world. Language, however, being the main tool of any 
interpretation, may cast doubt on the possibility of the truth of 
this interpretation, unless it is grounded in discourse, which al-
lows this possibility.  
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